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THE NEED FOR AN OMBUDSMAN
IN STATE GOVERNMENT
Frank E. Cooper*
The ascendancy of administrative adjudication during the last thirty years
has caused far-reaching changes in the operation of state government.
As the states have become concerned with the detailed regulation of
many forms of personal and business activity to an extent undreamed of
a generation ago, there have been created scores of administrative agencies
to carry out the rapidly mushrooming regulatory programs. The result
has been that in some respects the agencies have to a substantial extent
displaced the legislatures and the courts in the actual operation of state
government.
The typical pattern of much recent legislation in the states is an enact-
ment which first describes an area of social or economic activity deemed
to need regulation, and which then creates an administrative agency di-
rected and empowered to adopt such rules as the agency believes will best
serve the public interest in that area. Often, the governing statute does
not state in meaningful detail any guiding standards to control the agency's
action. The state legislature in effect says to the agency: "Here is the
problem; deal with it as you think best." Determination of actual legisla-
tive policy -the operative rules to which the public must conform- is
delegated to the agency.
The courts have also given place to the administrators. The "contested
cases" decided by the agencies each year (in which adversary claims of
private litigants are determined quasi-judicially) are probably of greater
importance to more people than the matters decided by the courts. A
determination by a state tax agency, for example, may add to the tax
burden of thousands of taxpayers, in amounts aggregating millions of dollars
in a single year. A decision by a state public service commission approving
a rate increase for an electric or telephone utility may bulk larger, in
point of dollars involved, than all the decisions handed down by the state
supreme court during the year.
Theoretically, judicial review is available by appeal from the agency
decisions. But far less than ten per cent of the cases decided by the
agencies are actually appealed to the courts, and even in this handful
of cases the scope of judicial review is extremely narrow. In many cases,
the courts do not have the power to reverse, even though the judges
believe the administrative decision is wrong.




Clearly, administrative agencies have become a part of the American
way of life. Agencies are depended on in most states for supervision and
regulation of agriculture, air pollution, banking, civil rights, civil service,
conservation, corporations, divorce proceedings, fair employment practices,
fisheries, highways, horse racing, insurance, labor relations, licensing (a
single state may have a score of agencies determining who may engage
in a wide variety of businesses and pursuits, from driving a car to growing
Christmas trees), liquor control, occupational permits (which may be re-
quired for barbers, contractcrs, druggists, optometrists, peddlers, plumbers,
and many other occupations), parole of prisoners, public utilities, public
welfare, railroads, revenue, securities, taxation, trucking, water resources,
workmen's compensation, zoning, and literally dozens of other fields of
activity.
Agencies determine what taxes the state's citizens will pay, whether
employees are entitled to benefits if they are injured at work or if they
lose their jobs, and whether the operator's license of careless auto drivers
will be revoked. They decide how much consumers will pay for water, gas,
and electricity. They have much to say about what wages a businessman
must pay, the prices he may charge, the ways in which he can merchandise
his products. Many men can avoid "court trouble", but few indeed can
avoid the administrative agencies. Like death and taxes (both of which are
now matters of administrative concern) the agencies reach everyone.
Despite the vast powers which have been delegated to state administra-
tive agencies, comparatively little attention has been paid to their organi-
zation or methods of operation. As a result, some state agencies in their
day-to-day operations fail to meet desirable standards of fair procedure.
Each year, thousands of American citizens emerge indignant from an
encounter with some agency representative who they assert has treated
them impolitely or denied them what they deem to be their rights. But
often the case does not involve enough to justify the expense of taking
it to court, and the outraged citizen fumes in frustration, concluding de-
jectedly that "it's not worthwhile trying to fight city hall."
To cure this unhappy situation, a governmental mechanism which is
new to America but which has worked well for more than one hundred
years in some European countries (which have had a much longer ex-
perience with administrative law) is now being seriously considered by the
legislatures of several states.
The plan involves the creation of a watchdog for the underdog. He is
called an Ombudsman, an abbreviation of the Swedish "justitieombuds-
man", literally translated as an "agent of justice".
A research survey conducted by the writer for the American Bar Foun-
dation disclosed many typical instances indicating the need for such an
institution in state governments, and illustrating how the need could be met




One of the most insidious problems that beset state administrative
agencies arises out of the common practice of tolerating ex parte approaches
to the officers charged with the responsibility for making decisions. In
state courts, it is considered unthinkable for a party to a case to approach
a judge privately in an attempt to influence his decision on a pending
matter. But many administrative officials, exercising quasi-judicial re-
sponsibilities, take it for granted that the parties in interest will seek out
such private consultations. Many administrative officials do little or nothing
to discourage such approaches; some, indeed, take the lead in seeking
them; and some lawyers consider it a part of their duty to utilize their
personal acquaintance with agency members in an attempt to influence
the decision.'
As a result, there is a danger that a license to open a liquor establish-
ment, or a permit to establish a truck line, may be awarded not to the
best qualified of competing applicants, but to the one whose cause is
championed by an agent who has influence with an agency. The technique
is pervasive; there have been instances where members of a state legislature
-who pass on the appropriations to pay the salaries of agency members
- undertake to influence decisions in pending cases.
Not only is there a danger that unfair results may obtain in particular
cases as a result of such ex parte approaches, there is an even greater
danger that these tactics may undermine public confidence in the agencies
themselves.
In only a few states are there specific statutory prohibitions outlawing
ex parte communications to agency representatives, and while a number
of state courts have strongly condemned the practice, it is not easy to bring
a case to court because of the difficulty of proving that such improper
approaches were utilized, or that they did in fact affect the agency's
decision.
It is in just such situations that the office of Ombudsman can effectively
protect the public interest. An Ombudsman, upon receiving a complaint,
could compel the agency members and everyone else involved to testify
under oath as to exactly what was said and done in such off-the-record
consultations. If he determined that there was a just basis for complaint,
the Ombudsman would take steps to persuade the agencies to stamp out
the practice. If the agencies showed a disinclination to comply with his
suggestions, he could publish an official report denouncing those who had
transgressed the proper limits. Further, if his investigations disclosed a
need for legislation to regulate the practice [such legislation exists in some
states, patterned on the Model State Administrative Procedure Act], he




could make appropriate recommendations to the legislature. Such recom-
mendations, coming from a high official, would command public support
for reform.
Unfair Hearing Procedures
Some years ago, in one midwestern state, a barber who maintained
his shop in a tiny hamlet many miles remote from the State Capitol
received a notice to appear and show cause before the state board of
barbers and cosmetologists why his license should not be revoked on charges
that he failed properly to sterilize combs and brushes. On the day ap-
pointed, he duly appeared with half a dozen witnesses - prepared, he
believed, to disprove the charges. But the chairman of the agency refused
to hear the barber's proofs, declaring the secret reports from the agency's
investigators established the barber's guilt so clearly that there was no
need to receive any evidence.
A court, of course, would have reversed so outrageous a decision. But
appeals to the court are costly and time-consuming, and this particular
barber unhappily accepted a suspension of his license and closed his shop
for several months,'rather than seeking judicial review.
Had there been an Ombudsman available to act on the barber's com-
plaint, relief would have been prompt and inexpensive. While the Om-
budsman would not have had power to reverse the agency action, there
can be no doubt that a mere threat of public disclosure would have per-
suaded the members of the agency to grant a rehearing and consider the
barber's evidence - the least that due process demands.
Local zoning boards are peculiarly subject to political pressure. In one
case which did reach a state's highest court, a manufacturing company
purchased a plant-site in an area zoned for such plants, and applied for
a building permit to which, under the zoning ordinance, it was entitled.
But the owners of nearby residences demanded a public hearing, and voiced
their objections so loudly and vociferously that the members of the zoning
board (overwhelmed, as the court found, by the "impact of a completely
committed audience reaction") denied the company the permit to which
it was entitled. The court granted relief.2
But if an Ombudsman had been available, it is likely he could have
persuaded the zoning board to do what the law required, without the
necessity of an appeal to the courts. What is more, the effect of inter-
vention by the Ombudsman would not have been restricted to this single
case. If, by instruction and persuasion (and threat of publicity, if neces-
sary) he had achieved improvements in the zoning board's procedures, the
improvements would have redounded to the benefit of all parties appearing




before the zoning board, including the hundreds of small property owners
who could not afford court appeals.
Unfairness in hearing procedures sometimes results from the bias of
the hearing officer. This is particularly likely to occur in cases where the
agency acts as prosecutor as well as judge. In recent years, courts have
had occasion to set aside administrative orders where it was found that
the chairman of the agency, assuming charge of the prosecution of the
case, assigned one of his subordinate employees to sit as hearing officer
and determine whether the chairman had proved the charges he was
pressing.3 Obviously, the subordinate could not act with judicial inde-
pendence and impartiality in such a case; if he decided against his boss,
his career might be imperiled.
In one case, where charges of professional misconduct brought against
a physician were being heard by a board composed of other doctors, one
of the members of the board- after listening to testimony for two days
-announced that he had heard enough, and asked leave to cast his
vote and be excused so that he could get back to his medical office. The
chairman of the board ruled that no votes could be cast until the de-
fendant's testimony had been heard; and the impatient member regretfully
resumed his place. 4 A semblance of fairness was thus preserved; but is
it realistic to assume that the defendant received what a Federal Court
of Appeals has described as the constitutional right of a defendant to have
a trial before a tribunal "imbued with the desire to accord to the parties
equal consideration" 5 ?
In cases like this, where lack of training and failure to appreciate the
responsibilities entailed in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions inhibit
proper performance on the part of administrative officers, an Ombudsman
could perform a valuable educational function.
It is not ill-will so much as lack of experience that is chiefly responsible
for inept performance on the part of state administrative officers. The
Ombudsman could do much to correct this deficiency. He would be an
individual "learned in the processes of law and government and having
a distinguished intellectual standing in his profession" (to quote the lan-
gauge of current legislative proposals for the establishment of such an
office). He would be paid a salary equal to that of a justice of the state's
supreme court, and his office would carry a status and prestige comparable
to that of the State's highest judicial officers. Suggestions for procedural
improvement coming from such an officer would be gratefully accepted
by administrative officials.
In some instances, responsibility for unfair hearing procedures must be
imputed to the commissioners in charge of the agency, rather than to their
3 State ex rel. Ellis v. Kelly, 145 W.Va. 70, 112 S.E.2d 641 (1960).
4 Brinkley v. Hassig, 130 Kan. 874, 289 P. 64 (1930), appeal dismissed, 282 U.S.
800 (1930).
5 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 9, 20 (7th Cir. 1940).
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staff assistants. Under typical administrative procedures, testimony is taken
before a hearing officer; this testimony is then stenographically tran-
scribed, and the commissioners are charged by statute with the duty of
examining this transcript and arriving at a decision based upon their
examination of the transcript, in light of exceptions filed by the parties to
the recommendation of the hearing officer. But cases have been taken to
court in which the commissioners have issued a formal decision before
the testimony was even transcribed. 6 Obviously, they could not have con-
sidered the transcript, for it was not in existence when they made their
decision. There are other like cases where a formal, mimeographed de-
cision was released to the press within a few minutes after the close of
oral argument - a fair indication that the oral argument was a waste
of time, for the decision had obviously been prepared before the oral
arguments were begun.
It is true, of course, that these are pathological cases. Most agency
members do the best job they can, most of the time. But the American
tradition calls for the elimination of all instances of unfair procedure.
Parties should have an opportunity to introduce their evidence in orderly,
dignified proceedings. The evidence should be weighed impartially. The
decision should be made solely on the basis of the evidence introduced
in the record, and should be made by officers who know what evidence
the record contains. This ideal is, unhappily, far from realization at the
present time.
An Ombudsman could do much to bring the actual performance of
the agencies more closely into line with the standards to which they are
expected to adhere. He would be under a duty to receive and consider
every complaint that a citizen had been subjected to unfair procedures,
at any level of state administration - police, school officials, or tax as-
sessors, as well as the more prestidigious agencies. He would be under a
duty to make investigations on his own motion, as well as to act on
complaints.
In his investigations- because of his statutory right to examine all the
documents in the agency's files (including those marked "secret" or "con-
fidential") and his power to compel testimony under oath- he could
discover facts as to the actual practices of agencies which are now un-
discoverable.
When he encountered unfairness in procedure, he would invite the agency
officials to "reason together" with him, urging them to follow his sugges-
tions for improving their procedures. If his suggestions were not accepted,
he would expose the offending officials to the glare of publicity and the
embarrassment of an official reprimand. If even this d;d not work - and
experience in other countries indicates that such publicity is an efficient
6T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 345 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1961); Weekes
v. O'Connell, 304 N.Y. 259, 107 N.E.2d 290 (1952); Walker v. DeConcini,
86 Ariz. 143, 341 P.2d 933 (1959).
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sanction- he could procure the institution of disciplinary proceedings
against officials who had violated any applicable law or regulation, and
could sponsor remedial legislation in the state legislature.
Impoliteness
An Ombudsman would not be concerned solely with charges of grave
misfeasance (in such matters as ex parte approaches or unfair hearing
procedures). His jurisdiction would extend to what is probably the most
common of all complaints against public employees- protests that a
citizen had been rudely or impolitely treated.
If a state trooper insulted a person to whom he was issuing a traffic
violation ticket, or if a clerk in a tax office displayed a sullen attitude,
or if a social worker adopted a domineering or patronizing attitude toward
welfare recipients- in all these cases, complaint could be made to an
Ombudsman. Such cases would not present a serious problem. If investi-
gation disclosed justification for the complaint, a quiet suggestion -
backed up by the possibility of an official public reprimand- would
doubtless be all that would be required.
Of more serious concern to the Ombudsman would be situations where
officially sanctioned agency policies were at odds with ideals of public
administration. He would be concerned, for example, with charges of
police cruelty, or charges that inmates of public institutions were mal-
treated, or charges that a department of public welfare adopted gestapo
tactics in investigating, say, the private behavior of women receiving public
aid as dependent mothers.
Delays
That "justice delayed is justice denied" is just as true in the administra-
tive agencies as in the courts. Current history shows that in a number of
states justice is denied in agency proceedings as a result of delay.
Suppose, for example, that the revenues of a small rural electric com-
pany are too low to cover its operating expenses, and so it applies to the
state public utility commission for permission to increase the rates charged
customers. The evidence introduced at the hearing establishes clearly the
need for relief. But no grant of permission to increase rates is forthcoming
from the commission. Three months, or six, or even a year may pass by;
the petition is still officially "under consideration." Normally, in this situa-
tion, the courts cannot intervene until the commission has made its ruling.
In the meantime, the rural electrical company is approaching the brink
of bankruptcy, with no effective means of obtaining the relief to which
it is entitled.
In cases involving a disagreement between a corporation and the state
corporation commission as to the amount of franchise tax or privilege fee
due from the company, it is not uncommon for the final administrative
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decision to come as much as two years after the due date of the tax. In
the meantime, if the corporation has refused to pay more than the amount
it believes due, it may be technically in default and liable to proceedings
to revoke its charter, or it may be disabled from bringing suit in the state
courts. Threats to impose these disabilities have been utilized as a means
of coercing companies into settlements.
While in some cases, such as those cited above, delay may be utilized
as a weapon to achieve extra-legal results, in the great majority of cases
delay results merely from lethargy. Neither civil service employees nor
political appointees normally have an instinct for speed. There is no
reward for pressing cases to a speedy decision; life is more enjoyable if
the business at hand is attended to in a leisurely manner. ["What if the
case load does pile up?" the civil servant is likely to ask. "It may convince
the legislature that we need more employees in the agency."]
Whatever the cause for undue delay, an Ombudsman would be able to
provide remedies that are not now available either through the legislature
or in the courts. By examination of records and taking the testimony of
employees - and by attending agency staff meetings and sitting in as an
official auditor to check the actual operations of the commission staff -
he could determine whether the delay was inevitable (reflecting, say, a
lack of sufficient manpower) or was the result of indolence, or was de-
liberate. If he found the agency was doing the best it could, but needed
more manpower, he could present persuasively documented recommenda-
tions to the legislature. If he found the delay was caused by inertia or
laziness or by improper motivation, his suggestions for improvement would
in all probability be respected and adopted by the agency heads, faced
as they would be with knowledge that non-compliance might lead to public
exposure, or public reprimand, or even prosecution.
Public Information
All agencies develop policies or informal rules of decision to implement
the statutes they administer. These policies and criteria not only serve to
interpret the statutory enactments; they are the actual determinants of
decision. Often they are reduced to writing (in the form of staff memo-
randa, or manuals, or handbooks, or "operations instructions" or staff
bulletins) but, although written, they may be treated as confidential docu-
ments and not made publicly available. The reasons for this lack of public
information are hard to pinpoint.
Some agencies say that they fear that if they fixed exact lines dis-
tinguishing the legal from the illegal, there would be those who would
be encouraged to go to the very brink of illegality, and that this would
ill serve the public interest.
Critics of the agencies charge that more often the lack of public in-
formation stems from a desire of the agencies to avoid committing them-
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selves to any fixed or definite rules. If fixed criteria of decision were
announced, a public clamor would be raised if the agency departed from
those criteria in the decision of a particular case; hence, it would be more
difficult for agencies to change their policies, and it would be more
difficult to conceal inconsistencies between successive decisions in like
cases.
Whatever the reasons for the lack of public information as to agency
policies and rules of decision, the results of this lack are serious. It leads
to situations where those subject to an agency's jurisdiction are unable
to ascertain the rules to which their conduct must conform. Attorneys
are unable to predict with any degree of confidence what decision the
agency would reach on particular facts. They cannot discover what argu-
ments would be persuasive to the agency in particular case situations, and
may fail to bring to the attention of the agency facts which might be
determinative of the outcome.
The conduct of public business should be public. Individuals are en-
titled to know the rules and policies by which their cases will be decided.
A number of states have enacted statutes seeking to guarantee this right,
but too frequently there are no effective means of making this guarantee
effective.7
Here again, an Ombudsman could readily fulfill the need. By exercise
of his powers of office, he could compel disclosure of the secret rules and
other policies or criteria of decisions, and on his own authority could cause
them to be published.
Extending or Modifying the Legislative Intent
It has been a long time since the N.L.R.B. ruled that an act of a ship's
captain in suppressing a mutiny could be punishable as an unfair labor
practice (the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, with the
pointed observation that an agency may not seek to effectuate the policies
of the particular statute it administers so single-mindedly as to ignore
other and equally important legislative objectives).8 But through all the
intervening years, a tendency has been observable in state as well as
federal agencies to magnify their stature by seeking to extend their juris-
diction to the furtherest possible limit - often pressing it beyond the
limits that the courts are willing to sustain.
The empire-building tendencies of administrators (i.e., their inclination
to broaden their jurisdiction beyond the limits intended by the legislature)
was described in graphic terms recently by a judge from the cattle raising
country who declared, in striking down an administrative rule, that it was
". .. simply a case where a board has decided that a field is open for
7 See COOPER, supra note 1, at 170, 171.
s Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
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regulation, has lassoed this field, and then looked for authority upon which
to hold onto its prized steer." 9
Likewise, there has been a consistent tendency on the part of the
agencies to set up and give effect to policies beyond or even at variance
with those of the statutes they are created to administer.
Although it is well-settled law, as stated by one court, that "an adminis-
trative officer may not make a rule or regulation that alters or enlarges
the terms of a legislative enactment," 10 the reports of the State appellate
courts disclose a discouragingly impressive number of cases in which
agency determinations have been reversed because the agency attempted
to alter or enlarge the terms of the governing statute.
A few typical (and admittedly extreme) examples will illustrate the point:
A state labor mediation agency, empowered only to assist in the negotia-
tion of labor-management agreements, undertook to conduct an election
to determine whether a union represented a majority of the company's
employees, although it was without power to conduct such an election.1
An agency revoked the license of the proprietor of a liquor store on
the grounds that the existence of a chute through the rear wall of the
store, through which packages could be delivered, violated a statutory
provision that a liquor store should have only one main entrance.1 2
Tax agencies assessed business property on a proportionately higher
basis than residential property, despite a statutory requirement that all
assessments must be on a uniform basis.13
A board of optometry prohibited advertising of a type that was per-
mitted by the controlling statute. 14
A licensing agency refused to grant a license unless the applicant agreed
to meet specified conditions which the agency had no authority to impose.1 5
A liquor control board refused to license liquor sales in a shopping
center, although this was permitted by statute,1 6 and imposed restrictions
on the transfer of a license which the statute did not authorize. 1 7
9 Lewis v. State Bd. of Health, 143 So. 2d 867, 877 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962),
cert. denied, 149 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1963).
10 County of Los Angeles v. State Dep't of Pub. Health, 158 Cal. App.2d 425, 438,
322 P.2d 968, 975 (2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
11Arnold Home, Inc. v. Labor Mediation Bd., 338 Mich. 315, 60 N.W.2d 905
(1953).
12 Terry v. Evans, 189 Tenn. 345, 225 S.W.2d 255 (1949).
13 State v. Alabama Power Co., 254 Ala. 327, 48 So.2d 445 (1950); People ex rel.
Dallas v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 26 ll.2d 292, 186 N.E.2d 335 (1962); Union
Pac. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 232 Ore. 521, 376 P.2d 80 (1962).
14 Stone v. Harris, 6 Wis.2d 634, 95 N.W.2d 764 (1959).
15 E.g., Baker v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.2d 803 (Ky. 1954); Barry v. O'Connell,
303 N.Y. 46, 100 N.E.2d 127 (1951); Phillips v. McLaughlin, 82 R.I. 224, 107
A.2d 301 (1954); Cloverleaf Kennel Club v. Racing Comm'n, 130 Colo. 505,
277 P.2d 226 (1954).
16Swalbach v. State Liquor Authority, 7 N.Y.2d 518, 200 N.Y.S.2d 1, 166 N.E.2d
811 (1960), motion for reargument denied, 8 N.Y.2d 934, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1025.
17 Obradovich Liquor License Case, 386 Pa. 342, 126 A.2d 435 (1956).
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A tax agency refused to permit a public utility company to use an
accounting system which it had been ordered to use by the public utilities
commission.' 8
A school board dismissed a teacher for reasons not permitted under the
statute.19
Relief can be obtained through the courts where an agency exceeds its
jurisdictional limits, or adopts policies which alter or extend the intent
of the governing statute. In most of the cases cited above, appeals were
taken and the courts granted appropriate relief.
But here, as in other cases of poor administration, the chief concern
is with the cases which are not taken to the courts, and where agencies
proceed, unchallenged, to carry out policies at odds with the legislative
purpose. It is in these cases that the Ombudsman would be particularly
effective.
It is here, too, that he would face his greatest challenge. He could not
reverse agency decisions. Nor could he (unless specifically authorized by
statute) perfect appeals to the courts. But he would be under a duty to
investigate, to state his views, and to expostulate with the agency if he
concluded the agency was exceeding its proper role. He would have the
right to bring the issue to public attention, by publicly criticizing the
agency's policies. If this were not effective, he could ask the legislature
to take remedial action. Through some combination of these functions,
he could achieve a broad measure of reform in most cases.
Summary of Ombudsman's Functions
Creation of the office of Ombudsman would provide an effective means
for examining, on behalf of citizens and of the legislature, instances of
alleged maladministration by public officials.
The means would include: (1) the power to discover (by examination
of records, by taking the testimony of administrative officials, and by
visiting their deliberative sessions), the policies actually followed by the
agencies, and the details of their operating methods; (2) the duty to form
an opinion as to the validity of charges that an agency's powers were
being abused, misused, or not used; (3) the privilege of consulting with
agency officials, urging upon them the desirability of amending their rules
or changing their procedures; (4) the right to publish findings, criticizing
or reprimanding administrative officials whose performance fails to meet
desirable standards; and (5) the power to make official recommendations to
the state legislature for remedial legislation.
By skillful employment of these techniques, the Ombudsman could
1S Detroit Edison Co. v. Corp. & Sec. Comm'n, 367 Mich. 104, 116 N.W.2d 194
(1962).
19 Laba v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957); Lowenstein v.




make significant progress toward (1) eliminating improper ex parte ap-
proaches to administrative officials and the employment of political
pressures; (2) guaranteeing fair hearing procedures; (3) protecting the
public from undue delay; (4) requiring agencies to clarify vague stat-
utory standards, and to publish their rules, policies, and criteria of
decision; and (5) discouraging the pervasive tendency of administrative
agencies to extend their jurisdiction unduly and to give effect to policies
which extend or are at odds with the legislative intent. In all these ways,
the Ombudsman could protect the interests of the private parties appear-
ing before the agencies.
The agencies themselves would also benefit from his recommendations.
Since his suggestions would be based on his specialized experience and
knowledge, and his overall view of the system, he could assist agencies in
(1) reducing inefficiency; (2) avoiding procedures which are unduly cum-
bersome; and (3) concentrating on the formulation of overall policies rather
than deciding each case on an ad hoc basis, temporizing with problems
rather than seeking an underlying solution.
The state legislature would also be a beneficiary. Legislators could
direct complaints from their constituents to the Ombudsman, rather than
undertaking to make their own investigation of alleged bureaucratic abuses.
They would benefit also from the circumstance that the Ombudsman,
on the basis of his broad knowledge and experience, could make incisive
recommendations for the clarification, amendment, or initiation of legis-
lation.
The Ombudsman, in short, would provide a continuous and informal
procedure for dealing with administrative malfunctions. He could discover
remedies for many of the common ailments of bureaucracy such as slow-
ness, rudeness, and obtuseness. He would afford a means of helping to
keep administration prompt, inexpensive, and flexible, at a minimum cost
to the government and no direct cost to the citizen.
How Office of Ombudsman Would be Organized
The legislative proposals introduced recently in several state legislatures,
while varying widely in detail, embody a common approach and exhibit
a similarity of pattern. They illustrate, in composite, a typical organiza-
tional structure for the office of Ombudsman.
Qualifications. A basic necessity to the successful functioning of his
office is the requirement that the Ombudsman be an individual whose
personal attainments are so high as to command the respect of the legisla-
ture, the general public, and the agency officials. Typical statutory pro-
visions directed to this end require that the Ombudsman must be "learned
in the processes of law and government," and that he be "a person of
distinguished accomplishments in the field of legal scholarship and ad-
ministrative law." To make it possible to induce men of such stature to
accept the office, it is normally provided that the Ombudsman's salary
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shall be equal to that of the justices of the state supreme court. The
intention of these legislative proposals is that the office of Ombudsman
should carry as great a prestige as that which attaches to membership
on the highest court of the state.
Appointment. It is recognized, in the pending legislative proposals, that
the Ombudsman should be free of all taint of partisan politics. Thus, in
the California bill, it was provided that the Ombudsman should be nom-
inated by a special committee consisting of the chief justice of the supreme
court, the attorney general, the president of the state university, and two
persons appointed respectively by the presiding officers of the two branches
of the state legislature. The Illinois bill provided for appointment by the
governor, but required the consent of two-thirds of each house of the
state legislature, thus assuring that the nominee have substantial bi-partisan
support. Typically, it is recognized that the Ombudsman should have the
security of a long term in office. Thus the California and Illinois bills
provided for six-year terms, and contemplated the reappointment of the
Ombudsman for as many as three successive terms. Most of the bills
prohibit the Ombudsman from engaging in any political activity.
Powers. The legislative bills provide that the Ombudsman shall receive
complaints concerning any administrative action or omission of any state
agency; that he shall in his discretion determine whether or not such
complaints deserve investigation; and that he may in his discretion initiate
investigations on his own motion.
He is given broad powers to assure that his investigations be thorough,
and that no relevant information be withheld from him. Typical provisions
to assure these objectives authorize him to compel by subpoena the taking
of oral testimony under oath and to compel the disclosure of any records
or documents that he deems relevant to the inquiry.
If it is his conclusion that the procedures or policies of the agency
should be altered, he is empowered to make appropriate recommendations
to the agency. If his recommendations are not complied with, or if his
investigation discloses misconduct, or breach of duty, or other actions
which he deems improper, he may make an official report to the legislature
and cause the same to be published for the information of the public. If
the agency still fails to take remedial action, the Ombudsman may recom-
mend remedial legislation to the state legislature.
Standards. The objectives which the Ombudsman would seek to attain
are well described by the provisions of the Connecticut legislative proposal
setting forth the standards which should control his recommendations. It
declares that the Ombudsman should take appropriate action when in his
opinion the administrative action or omission being investigated is:
1. Contrary to law;
2. Unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or discriminatory;
3. Based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact;
4. The result of exercising discretionary power for an improper purpose
or on irrelevant grounds or arbitrarily.
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Why an Ombudsman is Needed
The case for the enactment of legislation providing for an Ombudsman
in state governments was well put in a recent article by Jesse M. Unruh,
the Speaker of the Assembly of the California Legislature, who wrote:
"What remedies are open to the ordinary citizen against the action of a
large public agency? Against arrogance and delay there is no appeal. The
great majority of actual administrative decisions carry no formal right of
appeal. Where there is provision for appeal . . .the process is likely to be
costly and cumbersome. . . .We need to find some bridge between the
citizen and his government .. "20
The Ombudsman can provide such a bridge.
PROPOSED OMBUDSMAN ACT
Section 1 Short Title
This Act shall be known and may be cited as the Ombudsman Act.
Section 2 Definitions
For the purposes of this act:
(a) "Person" means any person, firm, corporation, association or
group of persons;
(b) "Agency" means any state board, commission, department, or
officer other than the Legislature or the Courts;
(c) "Administrative Action" means any action by an agency, and
includes any rules, regulation, interpretation, advisory opinion,
policy, practice, release, ruling, order, decision, and any action
taken with respect to licenses;
(d) "Operation" means the organization and internal administration
of an agency;
(e) "Omission" means any failure or refusal of an agency to take
administrative action;
(f) "Ombudsman" means the officer appointed as hereinafter pro-
vided.
Section 3 Office of The Ombudsman
There is hereby created in the State Government an Office of Ombuds-
man. The Ombudsman shall be a person learned in the processes of law
and government and distinguished by his accomplishments in the fields
of legal scholarship and administrative law. He shall be chosen without
regard to political affiliations. He shall not have been a member of the
Legislature during the two years preceding his appointment as Ombudsman
and shall not be eligible for election to the Legislature during his tenure
or for two years thereafter. He shall not hold any office for reward or
profit within the government of the State or any political subdivision




thereof during his tenure or for two years thereafter. He shall not engage
in any occupation for reward or profit outside the duties of his office
duing his tenure. He shall be paid an annual salary equal to that of an
associate justice of the Michigan Supreme Court. He shall also be entitled
to receive reimbursement for expenses actually and necessarily incurred
by him in the performance of his duties. He may appoint such officers,
employees, agents, and consultants, as he may deem necessary, prescribe
their duties, fix their compensation, and provide for reimbursement of
their expenses within the amount available therefor by appropriation.
Section 4 Selection And Appointment
There is hereby created the Commission For The Selection Of Can-
didates For The Office of Ombudsman. The Commission shall consist of
the Chairman of the Law Revision Commission, who shall act as Chair-
man, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the
President of the State Bar, the Lieutenant Governor, and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives. The Commission shall select not less than
two nor more than four qualified candidates for the Office of Ombudsman
and shall submit the names of the candidates to the Governor. The
Governor shall appoint one of the candidates so selected and, upon con-
firmation of the appointment by the Senate, the Ombudsman shall assume
office.
Section 5 Term of Office
The Ombudsman shall hold office for a term of six years from the
first day of January in the year of his appointment and until his successor
has been appointed and has qualified. He may from time to time be re-
appointed, but in no case shall any Ombudsman hold office for more than
three six-year terms. The Ombudsman may at any time be removed from
office by concurrent resolution of the Legislature for neglect of duty, mis-
conduct, or disability.
Section 6 Functions, Powers and Duties
The Ombudsman, with the assistance of his duly authorized officers,
employees, agents, or consultants, shall have the following functions,
powers, and duties:
(a) The Ombudsman may investigate, upon the complaint of any
person affected thereby or upon his own motion, any admin-
istrative action or omission or operation. If he elects not to
investigate a complaint, he shall inform the complainant, in
writing, of his reasons therefor;
(b) The Ombudsman may decline to entertain a complaint or de-
cline to undertake to investigate a complaint or decline to
continue the investigation:
i. If in his opinion the complainant or complainants have an
adequate remedy under existing law or administrative practice;
ii. If the complaint relates to a matter of policy as determined
by the Legislature and not of execution of the policy;
iii. If in his opinion investigation is unnecessary;
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iv. If the subject matter of the complaint is in his opinion trivial,
or the complaint is frivolous, vexatious or not made in good
faith;
v. If the complainant or complainants had knowledge of the mat-
ter complained of for a period of more than one year before
the complaint is received by the Ombudsman;
(c) The Ombudsman shall determine whether any administrative
action or omission or operation which he has investigated is
or was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or discriminatory, or
based upon a mistake of fact or law, or based upon a law or
regulation which in itself or in-its application is unreasonable,
unjust, oppressive, or discriminatory; or, in the case of the
exercise of discretionary power by an agency or officer or'
employee thereof, whether the power was exercised for an im-
proper purpose or arbitrarily or upon irrelevant grounds or con-
siderations or without stating the reasons therefor when such
a statement is required;
(d) Whenever his investigation discloses that any administrative
action or omission or operation is or was unreasonable, unjust,
oppressive, or discriminatory, or based upon a mistake of fact
or law, or based upon a law or regulation which in itself or in
its application is unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or discrimina-
tory; or, in the case of the exercise of discretionary power by
an agency or officer or employee thereof, that the power was
exercised for an improper purpose or arbitrarily or upon irrele-
vant grounds or considerations or without stating the reason
therefor when such a statement is required, the Ombudsman shall
recommend to the appropriate authority such action as will
rectify the matter complained of or investigated, giving his
reasons therefor, supported by -the relevant information obtained
in the course of his investigation. If the authority fails to follow
the recommendations or to take such other action within a
reasonable time as the Ombudsman deems to be adequate or
appropriate to rectify the matter, the Ombudsman may publish
such comments on the matter as he deems advisable. The
Ombudsman shall in any event inform the complainant or com-
plainants in such manner and at such time as he deems proper
of the results of his investigation;
(e) Whenever his investigation discloses any breach of duty or mis-
conduct of any officer or employee of an agency, the Ombuds-
man shall make a report thereof to the agency, the Attorney
General, the Governor, and the Legislature;
(f) The Ombudsman may make public all reports or recommenda-
tions issued under the provisions of this Act;
(g) The Ombudsman may issue subpoenas to require any person
to testify and to furnish any information and to produce any
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documents, papers, or other evidence which relate to any matter
under investigation and which are in the possession or under
the control of that person. If any person who has been properly
served refuses or neglects to appear and testify, or to produce
the documents, papers, or other evidence requested, the Om-
budsman may petition the Circuit Court in the county in which
the hearing or investigation is being conducted for an order
requiring the person to attend and testify or produce the docu-
mentary evidence. The Circuit Court shall hear the petition and
may enter an order requiring the person to obey the subpoena.
The Court may compel obedience to its order by attachment
as for contempt;
(h) The Ombudsman shall have power, without prior demand or
the issuance of a subpoena, to examine all files and records of
any agency, and to attend any meeting or executive session of
the members of any agency;
(i) The Ombudsman may consult with and cooperate with officials
of agencies having duties and responsibilities concerning admin-
istrative practices and procedures;
(j) The Ombudsman may consult with and cooperate with persons,
organizations, and groups concerned with administrative prac-
tices and procedures of agencies;
(k) The Ombudsman may determine who may attend any hearing
held by him and whether any transcript of such hearings shall
be made public, except that any witness shall be entitled to have
counsel present while the witness is being questioned;
(1) The Ombudsman may undertake any studies, inquiries, surveys,
or analyses he may deem relevant through his office or in co-
operation with any public or private agencies including educa-
tional, civic, and research organizations, colleges, universities,
institutions, or foundations;
(m) The Ombudsman may apply to any Circuit Court for a declara-
tory judgment whenever a question arises as to the authority of
the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation or issue any report
or recommendation under the provisions of this Act;
(n) The Ombudsman may adopt, amend, and rescind any rules and
regulations (not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act)
which he finds necessary or appropriate to carry out the pro-
visions of this Act.
Section 7 Testimony To Be Privileged
Except on the trial of a person for perjury in respect to his sworn
testimony, no statement made or answer given in the course of an in-
vestigation by the Ombudsman shall be admissible in evidence against
any person in any subsequent judicial or administrative proceeding. No
evidence in respect to proceedings before the Ombudsman shall be given
in evidence against any person. Every person shall have the same priv-
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ileges in relation to the giving of information, the answering of questions,
and the production of documents and papers as witnesses have in the
Courts of this State.
Section 8 Limitation On Jurisdiction Of The Courts
No proceeding or report of the Ombudsman shall be challenged,
quashed, or called into question in any Court, except as they contravene
the provisions of this Act. No proceedings, civil or criminal, shall lie
against the Ombudsman or against any persons holding any office or
appointment under the Ombudsman for anything such persons may do,
report, or say, in the course of the exercise of their functions under this
Act unless it is shown that they acted in bad faith. The Ombudsman,
and any such person, shall not be called to give evidence in any Court
or in any proceeding of a judicial investigation of his functions.
Section 9 Offense Of Obstructing The Ombudsman
Any person who, without lawful justification or excuse, wilfully ob-
structs, hinders, or resists the Ombudsman in the exercise of his powers
under this Act, or who refuses or wilfully fails to comply with any lawful
requirement of the Ombudsman under this Act, or who wilfully makes
any false statement to or misleads or attempts to mislead the Ombudsman
in the exercise of his powers under this Act, shall be guilty of the offense
of obstructing the Ombudsman. Anyone convicted of this offense shall
be fined not more than ( ) and/or sentenced to imprisonment
for a term of not more than ( - ).
Section 10 Prior Rights And Remedies Not Affected
The provisions of this Act are in addition to the provisions of any other
enactment under which any remedy or right of appeal is provided for any
person, or any procedure is provided for the inquiry into or the investiga-
tion of any matter, and nothing in this Act shall limit or affect any such
remedy, right of appeal, or procedure. The powers conferred on the
Ombudsman by this Act may be exercised notwithstanding any provision
in any enactment to the effect that the administrative action or omission
or operation shall be final or that no appeal shall lie in respect thereof.
Section 11 Reports
The Ombudsman shall report annually to the Legislature. His report,
which shall be a public document, shall contain his recommendations
regarding legislation and administrative procedures based upon the infor-
mation which has come to his attention in the course of his activities.
Section 12 Severability
If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act or
the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than
those as to which it is held invalid shall not be affected thereby.
Section 13 Appropriation (Optional)
The sum of ( ), or so much thereof as may be necessary, is
hereby appropriated for the administration of this Act.
